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Showing posts with label layer 3. Show all posts
Showing posts with label layer 3. Show all posts

Thursday, 29 August 2013

Layer 3 (Network Layer) Attack and Mitigation

With the likes of protocols like IP(Internet Protocol) lets us take a look into what Layer 3 Network Layer attacks and their mitigation procedures looks like:

  • IP Spoofing
  • Routing (RIP) Attacks
  • ICMP Attacks
  • PING Flood (ICMP Flood)
  • Ping of Death Attack
  • Teardrop Attack
  • Packet Sniffing

IP Spoofing:
IP Spoofing is changing the source ip address while sending to the destination with some trusted IP. A way to mislead the receiver on the origin of the information sent. Method can be used in Spamming and to perpetrate Denial of Service.
Tools:

  • Engage Packet Builder v2.20 - Scriptable packet builder for Windows
  • HPing v2.0.0 - Command-line oriented TCP/IP packet assembler/analyzer
  • Nemesis v1.4 beta3 - Command-line portable IP stack
  • LSRscan v1.0 - Loose Source Route Scanning Tool
  • Scapy v2.0.0.10 - Interactive packet manipulation tool

Mitigations:

  • Implement Input access-lists; they should filter at the ingress interfaces. 
  • Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) is a common technique used to mitigate source address spoofing by discarding the IP Packets that lack a verifiable IP source address in the IP Routing Table.
  • IP Source Guard is a Layer 2 security feature that prevents IP spoofing attacks by restricting IP traffic on untrusted Layer 2 ports to clients with an assigned IP address.

Routing (RIP) Attack:
Routing Information Protocol (RIP) is used to distribute routing information within networks, such as shortest-paths, and advertising routes out from the local network. The original version of RIP has no built in authentication, and the information provided in a RIP packet is often used without verifying it. An attacker could forge a RIP packet, claiming his host "X" has the fastest path out of the network. All packets sent out from that network would then be routed through X, where they could be modified or examined. An attacker could also use RIP to effectively impersonate any host, by causing all traffic sent to that host to be sent to the attacker's machine instead.
Tools:

  • RPAK (Routing Protocol Attack Kit)- contains tools for RIP, RIP2, IGRP and OSPF.  

Mitigations:

  • The version 2 of RIP was enhanced with a simple password authentication algorithm, which makes RIP attack harder to happen.
  • IPSec VPN provides a way to keep routing information encrypted among the routers implemented the IPsec VPN.

ICMP Attack:
ICMP is used by the IP layer to send one-way informational messages to a host. There is no authentication in ICMP, which leads to attacks using ICMP that can result in a denial of service, or allowing the attacker to intercept packets. An attacker sends forged ICMP echo packets to vulnerable networks' broadcast addresses. All the systems on those networks send ICMP echo replies to the victim, consuming the target system's available bandwidth and creating a denial of service (DoS) to legitimate traffic.
Tools:

  • icmp-reset - Blindly resetting arbitrary TCP connections (icmp-reset.tar.gz)
  • icmp-quench - Blindly reducing the throughput of an arbitrary TCP connections (icmp-quench.tar.gz)
  • icmp-mtu - Blindly reducing the performance of an arbitrary TCP connections (icmp-mtu.tar.gz)

Mitigations:

  • Most ICMP attacks can be effectively reduced by deploying Firewalls at critical locations of a network to filter un-wanted traffic and from any destinations.
  • In addition, to keep a reasonable balance between services and security, you should configure your ICMP parameters in your network devices as follows:
            - Allow ping ICMP Echo-Request outbound and Echo-Reply messages inbound.

            - Allow traceroute TTL-Exceeded and Port-Unreachable messages inbound.
            - Allow path MTU ICMP Fragmentation-DF-Set messages inbound.
            - Blocking other types of ICMP traffic.

PING Flood (ICMP Flood):
PING is one of the most common uses of ICMP which sends an ICMP "Echo Request" to a host, and waits for that host to send back an ICMP "Echo Reply" message. Attacker simply sends a huge number of "ICMP Echo Requests" typically overloading its victim that it expends all its resources responding until it can no longer process valid network traffic.
Tools:

  • Trinoo
  • Tribe Flood Network (TFN)
  • Stacheldraht

Mitigations:

  • The most obvious way to mitigate an ICMP/PING Flood is to block ICMP altogether at perimeter of your network via firewall filters.
  • By limiting the rate at which a single source can send ICMP Packets. This threshold is per second.


Ping of Death Attack:
The principle of ping of death simply involves creating an IP datagram whose total size exceeds the maximum authorized size (65,536 bytes). When such a packet is sent to a system with a vulnerable TCP/IP stack, it will cause the system to crash.
Tools:

  • CPU DEATH PING 2.0

Mitigations:

  • All the recent and latest OS are not vulnerable to this attack.


Teardrop Attack:
The principle of the Teardrop attack involves inserting false offset information into fragmented packets. As a result, during reassembly, there are empty or overlapping fragments that can cause the system to be unstable.
Tools:

  • Nessus API: Packet forgery

Mitigations:

  • A simple reboot is the preferred remedy after this happen.
  • Recent systems are no longer vulnerable to this attack.


Packet Sniffing:
Because most network applications distribute network packets in clear text, a packet sniffing tool can exploit information passed in clear text providing the hacker with sensitive information such as user account names and passwords.
Tools:

  • Wireshark
  • TCPdump

Mitigations:

  • Authentication - Using strong authentication, such as one-time passwords.
  • Cryptography - The most effective method for countering packet sniffers does renders them irrelevant.
  • Switched Infrastructure - Deploy a switched infrastructure to counter the use of packet sniffers in your environment.
  • Anti-sniffer tools - Use these tools to employ software and hardware designed to detect the use of sniffers on a network.

Tuesday, 27 August 2013

Firewall Audit Checklist


No.
Security Elements
Review the rule-sets to ensure that they follow the order as follows:
    • anti-spoofing filters (blocked private addresses, internal addresses appearing from the outside)
    • User permit rules (e.g. allow HTTP to public webserver)
    • Management permit rules (e.g. SNMP traps to network management server)
    • Noise drops (e.g. discard OSPF and HSRP chatter)
    • Deny and Alert (alert systems administrator about traffic that is suspicious)
    • Deny and log (log remaining traffic for analysis)
Firewalls operate on a first match basis, thus the above structure is important to ensure that suspicious traffic is kept out instead of inadvertently allowing them in by not following the proper order.
Application based firewall
Ensure that the administrators monitor any attempts to violate the security policy using the audit logs generated by the application level firewall. Alternatively some application level firewalls provide the functionality to log to intrusion detection systems. In such a circumstance ensure that the correct host, which is hosting the IDS, is defined in the application level firewall.
Ensure that there is a process to update the application level firewall’s vulnerabilities checked to the most current vulnerabilities.
Ensure that there is a process to update the software with the latest attack signatures.
In the event of the signatures being downloaded from the vendors’ site, ensure that it is a trusted site.
In the event of the signature being e-mailed to the systems administrator, ensure that digital signatures are used to verify the vendor and that the information transmitted has not been modified en-route.
The following commands should be blocked for SMTP at the application level firewall:
    • EXPN (expand)
    • VRFY (verify)
    • DEBUG
    • WIZARD
The following command should be blocked for FTP:
  • PUT
Review the denied URL’s and ensure that they are appropriate for e.g. any URL’s to hacker sites should be blocked. In some instances organisations may want to block access to x-rated sites or other harmful sites. As such they would subscribe to sites, which maintain listings of such harmful sites. Ensure that the URL’s to deny are updated as released by the sites that warn of harmful sites.
Ensure that only authorized users are authenticated by the application level firewall.
Stateful inspection
Review the state tables to ensure that appropriate rules are set up in terms of source and destination IP’s, source and destination ports and timeouts.
Ensure that the timeouts are appropriate so as not to give the hacker too much time to launch a successful attack.
For URL’s
    • If a URL filtering server is used, ensure that it is appropriately defined in the firewall software. If the filtering server is external to the organisation ensure that it is a trusted source.
    • If the URL is from a file, ensure that there is adequate protection for this file to ensure no unauthorized modifications.
Ensure that specific traffic containing scripts; ActiveX and java are striped prior to being allowed into the internal network.
If filtering on MAC addresses is allowed, review the filters to ensure that it is restricted to the appropriate MAC’s as defined in the security policy.
Logging
Ensure that logging is enabled and that the logs are reviewed to identify any potential patterns that could indicate an attack.
Patches and updates
Ensure that the latest patches and updates relating to your firewall product is tested and installed.
If patches and updates are automatically downloaded from the vendors’ websites, ensure that the update is received from a trusted site.
In the event that patches and updates are e-mailed to the systems administrator ensure that digital signatures are used to verify the vendor and ensure that the information has not been modified en-route.
Location – DMZ
Ensure that there are two firewalls – one to connect the web server to the internet and the other to connect the web server to the internal network.
In the event of two firewalls ensure that it is of different types and that dual NIC’s are used. This would increase security since a hacker would need to have knowledge of the strengths, weaknesses and bugs of both firewalls.
The rule-sets for both firewalls would vary based on their location e.g. between web server and the internet and between web server and the internal network.
Vulnerability assessments/ Testing
Ascertain if there is a procedure to test for open ports using nmap and whether unnecessary ports are closed.
Ensure that there is a procedure to test the rule-sets when established or changed so as not to create a denial of service on the organisation or allow any weaknesses to continue undetected.
Compliance with security policy
Ensure that the rule-set complies with the organisation security policy.
Ensure that the following spoofed, private (RFC 1918) and illegal addresses are blocked:
Standard unroutables
    • 255.255.255.255
    • 127.0.0.0
Private (RFC 1918) addresses
  • 10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255
  • 172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255
  • 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255
Reserved addresses
  • 240.0.0.0
Illegal addresses
  • 0.0.0.0
UDP echo
ICMP broadcast (RFC 2644)
Ensure that traffic from the above addresses is not transmitted by the interface.
Ensure that loose source routing and strict source routing (lsrsr & ssrr) are blocked and logged by the firewall.
Port restrictions
The following ports should blocked:
Service
Port Type
Port Number
DNS Zone Transfers except from external secondary DNS servers
TCP

53

TFTP Daemon
UDP
69
Link
TCP
87
SUN RPC
TCP & UDP
111
BSD UNIX
TCP
512 – 514
LPD
TCP
515
UUCPD
TCP
540
Open Windows
TCP & UDP
2000
NFS
TCP & UDP
2049
X Windows
TCP & UDP
6000 – 6255
Small services
TCP & UDP
20 and below
FTP
TCP
21
SSH
TCP
22
Telnet
TCP
23
SMTP (except external mail relays)
TCP
25
NTP
TCP & UDP
37
Finger
TCP
79
HTTP (except to external web servers)
TCP
80
POP
TCP
109 &110
NNTP
TCP
119
NTP
TCP
123
NetBIOS in Windows NT
TCP &UDP
135
NetBIOS in Windows NT
UDP
137 & 138
NetBIOS
TCP
139
IMAP
TCP
143
SNMP
TCP
161 &162
SNMP
UDP
161 &162
BGP
TCP
179
LDAP
TCP &UDP
389
SSL (except to external web servers)
TCP
443
NetBIOS in Win2k
TCP &UDP
445
Syslog
UDP
514
SOCKS
TCP
1080
Cisco AUX port
TCP
2001
Cisco AUX port (stream)
TCP
4001
Lockd (Linux DoS Vulnerability)
TCP &UDP
4045
Cisco AUX port (binary)
TCP
6001
Common high order HTTP ports
TCP
8000, 8080, 8888

Remote access
If remote access is to be used, ensure that the SSH protocol (port 22) is used instead of Telnet.
File Transfers
If FTP is a requirement, ensure that the server, which supports FTP, is placed in a different subnet than the internal protected network.
Mail Traffic
Ascertain which protocol is used for mail and ensure that there is a rule to block incoming mail traffic except to internal mail.
ICMP (ICMP 8, 11, 3)
Ensure that there is a rule blocking ICMP echo requests and replies.
Ensure that there is a rule blocking outgoing time exceeded and unreachable messages.
IP Readdressing/IP Masquerading
Ensure that the firewall rules have the readdressing option enabled such that internal IP addresses are not displayed to the external untrusted networks.
Zone Transfers
If the firewall is stateful, ensure packet filtering for UDP/TCP 53. IP packets for UDP 53 from the Internet are limited to authorized replies from the internal network. If the packet were not replying to a request from the internal DNS server, the firewall would deny it. The firewall is also denying IP packets for TCP 53 on the internal DNS server, besides those from authorized external secondary DNS servers, to prevent unauthorized zone transfers.
Egress Filtering
Ensure that there is a rule specifying that only traffic originating from IP’s within the internal network be allowed. Traffic with IP’s other than from the Internal network are to be dropped.
Ensure that any traffic originating from IP’s other than from the internal network are logged.
Critical servers
Ensure that there is a deny rule for traffic destined to critical internal addresses from external sources. This rule is based on the organisational requirements, since some organisations may allow traffic via a web application to be routed via a DMZ.
Personal firewalls
Ensure that laptop users are given appropriate training regarding the threats, types of elements blocked by the firewall and guidelines for operation of the personal firewall. This element is essential, since often times personal firewalls rely on user prompt to respond to attacks e.g. whether to accept/deny a request from a specific address.
Review the security settings of the personal firewall to ensure that it restricts access to specific ports, protects against known attacks, and that there is adequate logging and user alerts in the event of an intrusion.
Ensure that there is a procedure to update the software for any new attacks that become known.
Alternatively most tools provide the option of transferring automatic updates via the internet. In such instances ensure that updates are received from trusted sites.
Distributed firewalls
Ensure that the security policy is consistently distributed to all hosts especially when there are changes to the policy.
Ensure that there are adequate controls to ensure the integrity of the policy during transfer, e.g. IPSec to encrypt the policy when in transfer.
Ensure that there are adequate controls to authenticate the appropriate host. Again IPSec can be used for authentication with cryptographic certificates.
Stealth Firewalls
Ensure that default users and passwords are reset.
Ensure that the firewall is appropriately configured to know which hosts are on which interface.
Review the firewall access control lists to ensure that the appropriate traffic is routed to the appropriate segments.
A stealth firewall does not have a presence on the network it is protecting and it makes it more difficult for the hacker to determine which firewall product is being used and their versions and to ascertain the topology of the network.
Ensure that ACK bit monitoring is established to ensure that a remote system cannot initiate a TCP connection, but can only respond to packets sent to it.
Continued availability of Firewalls
Ensure that there is a hot standby for the primary firewall.